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Abstract:
The money-age distribution is found to be hump-shaped for the US economy. The variation
(inequality) of cash holdings within generations increases (declines) with age. Furthermore, cash
holdings are found to be only weakly correlated with both income and wealth. We analyze three
motives for money demand in an overlapping generations model in order to explain this eﬀect:
1) money in the utility, 2) an economy with costly credit service, and 3) limited participation.
Both the simple money-in-the-utility model and the economy with the cash-credit goods are able
to replicate the hump-shape proﬁles of cash holdings and its variation, but not the decreasing
inequality within generations over age. In addition, we discuss the optimality of the Friedman
rule in heterogeneous-agent economies. In the ﬁrst two models, the optimal inﬂation rate is above
zero.1 Introduction
The dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) literature has discussed the distribution of income
and wealth to a large extent, but has basically ignored the distribution of cash. D´ ıaz-
Gim´ enez, Quadrini and R´ ıos-Rull (1997) document the facts on the U.S. Distributions of
earnings, income, and wealth. Earnings and income are much less concentrated than and
only weakly correlated with wealth. Huggett (1996) shows that these facts can be replicated
in a satisfactory manner in an OLG model where agents are characterized by heterogeneous
productivity and receive social security. Huggett and Ventura (2000) also explain the
consumption behavior over the life-cycle and explain why low-income households do not
save.
To the best of our knowledge there is no comparable study on the money distribution over
the life cycle. We use empirical evidence from the US to document that 1) cash holdings
are hump-shaped over the life-cycle, 2) the variation of cash holdings increases with age,
and 3) the variational coeﬃcient of cash declines over the life-cycle. Furthermore, we ﬁnd
cash holdings to be only weakly correlated with income and wealth. Surprisingly, when we
regress money holdings on age, income, and wealth, income is not a signiﬁcant explanatory
variable. The empirical evidence is found to be stable over time.
We develop a monetary general equilibrium model in order to explain the heterogeneity of
cash holdings across individuals. Money is introduced in three diﬀerent ways. First, we
look at money in the utility. Households save in the form of money or capital. Second,
we introduce costly credit. Households can consume a continuum of commodities that
can be purchased with either cash or credit. Credit, however, is costly as in Dotsey and
Ireland (1996). Again, money is a poor store of value since it is dominated in return by
capital. Third, we look at limited participation. Firms need to ﬁnance wage expenditures
with a loan, while households deposits part of their money at a bank. The central bank
injects the money into the banking sector after the households have made the deposits,
but before the ﬁrms ask for a loan. We ﬁnd that the money-in-the-utility model falls short
in the explanation of the inequality of cash holdings within generations. Contrary to the
empirical observations the inequality generated by the model is low and increases over age.
The recent literature has emphasized the diﬀerence of the inﬁnitely-lived representative
agent model (ILRA) and the overlapping generations model (OLG) regarding the optimal-
1ity of the Friedman rule. Freeman (1993) demonstrates that the Friedman rule is only
optimal in an OLG model if the bequest motive is active. Bhattarchary, Haslag and Rus-
sell (2005) show that the key diﬀerence between the OLG and the ILRA model accounting
for this divergent behavior are the intergenerational transfers that are caused by the re-
distribution of the seignorage. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no paper
that studies the optimal inﬂation rate in a computable general equilibrium OLG model for
diﬀerent speciﬁcations of money demand. We ﬁnd that the optimal inﬂation rate crucially
depends on the modelling of money. In our money-in-the-utility model, we ﬁnd an optimal
inﬂation rate equal to 4.60%. Reducing the inﬂation rate from the US postwar average
rate of 4.32% to 0% would result in steady-state welfare losses equal to 1.15% of total
consumption.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 documents the empirical facts
of the money-age distribution for the US economy. Section 3 introduces the overlapping-
generations model with two assets, money and capital. The model is calibrated with regard
to the characteristics of the US economy in section 4. Our numerical results are presented
in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical observations
We use data from the 1994 PSID data and wealth ﬁle.1 Money, m, is deﬁned as money
in checking or savings accounts, money market funds, certiﬁcates of deposit, government
savings bonds, and treasury bills. Capital, k, consists of shares of stock in publicly held
corporations, mutual funds, and investment funds and other savings or assets, such as
bond funds and life insurance policies. Total family income is made of taxable and transfer
income of head, wife, and other family unit members and Social Security Income. We
observe the following regularities:
1. Money M is only weakly correlated with income Y (0.19) and wealth A (0.33).
1We included only households with strictly positive cash holdings in our sample. To analyze the cash
holding behavior depending on age in ﬁgures 1-3, we group the households in the following age categories:
20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59, 60-64, 65-69, 70-74, 75-79, 80+.
2Figure 1: Cash holdings over the life-cycle
2. When we regress money on age, income and wealth, income is not a signiﬁcant
variable.2
2This results is insensitive to the modelling of money and income in logs or level. However, we still
have to study the sensitivity of these results with regard to the introduction of dummy terms on race and
gender.
3Table 1. Estimates of the following regression model model:
Mi = ¯0 + ¯1Yi + ¯2Y 2
i + ¯3Ai + ¯4A2











Note: ¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤ ´ signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1% level of signiﬁcance;
Newey-West HAC standard errors.
3. Cash holdings over the life-cycle are hump-shaped. See Figure 1. We approximated
the empirical money-age distribution (solid line) with the help of a 3rd degree poly-
nomial (broken line).
4. The standard deviation of cash is hump-shaped as well. See Figure 2.
5. The dispersion as measured by the variational coeﬃcient of cash holdings falls over
the life-cycle, but the relationship is not monotonous as inequality of cash holdings
4Figure 2: Standard deviation of cash over the life-cycle
peak around age 25-29. See Figure 3. We still have to present evidence from various
PSID surveys whether this observations is robust over time.
6. As illustrated in Figure 4, money is more unequally distributed than income and
earnings, and almost as concentrated as wealth. The data for income, earnings and
wealth is taken from the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances.
3 The model
We study a general equilibrium overlapping generations model with three diﬀerent motives
for money demand: 1) money-in-the-utility, 2) a cash-credit good, and 3) limited participa-
tion. Four sectors can be charted: households, production, banking, and the government.
Households maximize discounted life-time utility. Agents can save either with money or
with capital. Individuals are heterogeneous with regard to their productivity and cannot
insure against idiosyncratic income risk. Firms maximize proﬁts. Output is produced
with the help of labor and capital. The government collects taxes from labor and interest
income in order to ﬁnance its expenditures on government consumption. The government
5Figure 3: Cash holdings over the life-cycle
also provides social security and controls the money supply. In the limited-participation
model, banks receive deposits from households and lend them to ﬁrms. We do restrict our
analysis to steady-state behavior. For simplicity of notation we drop the time indices of
the aggregate variables in our economy when appropriate.
3.1 Households
Every year, a generation of equal measure is born. The total measure of all generations is
normalized to one. As we only study steady-state behavior, we concentrate on the behavior
of an individual born in period 0. Their ﬁrst period of life is period 1. The total measure
of all households is normalized to one.
Households live a maximum of T + T R years. Lifetime is stochastic and agents face a
probability sj of surviving up to age j conditional on surviving up to age j ¡ 1. During
their ﬁrst T years, agents supply one unit of labor inelastically. After T years, retirement is
mandatory. Workers are heterogeneous with regard to their labor earnings. Labor earnings
e(z;j)w are stochastic and depend on individual age j, an idiosyncratic labor productivity
shock z, and the wage rate w. Furthermore, agents hold two kinds of assets, real money
6Figure 4: Cross-section distribution of earnings, income, wealth and money
m = M=P and capital k, where M and P denote nominal money and the price level,
respectively. The household h is born without any capital in period t, kh
1t ´ 0. The ﬁrst
generation is endowed with a strictly positive amount of nominal money, Mh
1t = ¯ Mh
0.3
Capital or, equally, equity k earns a real interest rate r. Parents do not leave altruistic
bequests to their children. All accidental bequests are conﬁscated by the state.
















where ¯ and ut the discount factor and utility in period t, respectively. We will study
various roles for money. In our case 1, we simply consider money in the utility:





where c, m, and ¾ > 0 denote consumption, real-money balances, and the coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion, respectively.
3Otherwise, the level of utility at age 1 is not well-deﬁned. The calibration of ¯ Mh
0 is discussed in section
4.
7In our second speciﬁcation, consumers can purchase consumption with cash or credit as in
Schreft (1992), Gillman (1993), or Dotsey and Ireland (1996). The consumption goods are
indexed by i 2 [0;1], and the consumption aggregator is given by c = infifc(i)g. Therefore,
the individuals will consume the same amount of all goods as in Schreft (1992). The period
utility ut is of the form




In order to buy an amount c of good i with credit, the household must purchase ·(c;i)
units of ﬁnancial services. The function ·(:;:) is weakly increasing in c, strictly increasing
in i, and satisﬁes limi!1 °(c;i) = 1 for all c ¸ 0. According to the latter assumption,
some goods will be purchased with cash, and the demand for money is well deﬁned. In










For ·1 = 0, ﬁxed costs are zero, and the technology displays constant returns to scale.4
Intermediation of credit services is subject to perfect competition, and in order to produce
one unit of service one eﬃciency unit of labor is used. In equilibrium, the ﬁnancial service
companies make zero proﬁt, and the fees q per unit of ﬁnancial service sold is equal to the
wage rate w.
The household will purchase a fraction ³ 2 [0;1) of consumption goods with credit. He
faces the following cash-in-advance constraint on his remaining purchases:
case 2: c(1 ¡ ³) · m: (5)
In our third speciﬁcation, we look at limited participation. In this case, household deposit
part of the ﬁnancial wealth at banks at the gross nominal interest R. The ﬁrms pay wages
to the households before they sell their output. To ﬁnance the wage bill they borrow
money from the banking sector. The government injects the money via the banking sector.
4Erosa and Ventura (2002) have shown that inﬂation does not aﬀect (increases) wealth inequality in
the case of constant (decreasing) returns to scale.
8Crucially banks receive the monetary transfer after households have decided about the
volume of their banking deposits.
Households hold ﬁnancial wealth Mt = Dt+Xt where Dt is the amount deposited at banks
and Xt are cash balances kept for the purchase of consumption goods. Since households
receive wages before they go shopping, their cash-in-advance constraint is




xt + (1 ¡ ¿w ¡ µ)wte(zh
t ;j); t · T
xt + b(¯ eh
jt); t > T:
(6)
where xt, ¿w, and µ denote real cash balances, labor income taxes, and social security
contributions, respectively.
The j-year old agent h receives income from capital kh
j;t and labor e(zh
t ;j)w in period t.
After retirement agents do not work, e(z;j) = 0 for j > T. The budget constraint of the
j-year old household h in period t, j = 1;:::;T + T R, is given by:5
(1 ¡ ¿r)rk
h
j;t + (1 ¡ ¿w ¡ µ)we(z
h
t ;j) + b(¯ e
h
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0 ·(c;i) di + kh
j+1;t+1 + mh
j+1;t+1(1 + ¼) ¡ Seign case 2
ch
t + (1 ¡ ¿r)(R ¡ 1)dh
t + ΩB + kh
j+1;t+1 + mh
j+1;t+1(1 + ¼) case 3
where Seign and ¼t =
Pt¡Pt¡1
Pt¡1 denote seignorage and the inﬂation rate, respectively. In
cases 1 and 2, households receive the seignorage. In the limited participation model,
the central bank injects the increase in the money supply in the banking sector, while
households also receive lump-sum proﬁts from banks, ΩB, and earn interest R on their real
deposits dh
t. Real interest income is taxed at the rate ¿r. In addition, the households receive
transfers tr from the government. Social security beneﬁts bt(¯ eh;j) depend on the agent’s
age j as well as on an average of past earnings ¯ eh of the household h. Following Huggett






0 for j · T
b0 + b1(¯ ej;t) for j > T
(8)
5At the end of the ﬁnal period, kh
T+T R+1;t = Mh
T+T R+1;t ´ 0.
9The function b1(¯ ej;t) is described in more detail in section 4.
3.2 Production
Firms are of measure one and produce output with eﬀective labor N and capital K. Ef-
fective labor N is paid the wage w. In the case of the limited participation model, ﬁrms
have to pay workers in advance and have to borrow wN at the nominal interest rate R¡1
in advance. In case 1 and 2, R = 1. Capital K is hired at rate r and depreciates at
rate ±. Production Y is characterized by constant returns to scale and assumed to be
Cobb-Douglas:
Y = F(K;N) = K
®N
1¡®: (9)
In a factor market equilibrium, factors are rewarded with their marginal product:





1¡® ¡ ±: (11)
Consequently, proﬁts are zero.
3.3 Banking Sector
In the limited participation model we also model a banking sector. At the beginning of
period t banks receive deposits of size Dt from households. Government transfers the
amount Mt+1 ¡ Mt to the banks that are able to lend Dt + Mt+1 ¡ Mt to ﬁrms. At the
end of the period t they pay interest and principal RDt to their creditors and distribute














The government consists of the ﬁscal and monetary authority. Nominal money grows at




10In cases 1 and 2, seignorage Seign = Mt+1¡Mt is transferred lump-sum. In case 3, money
is injected into the banking sector.
The government uses the revenues from taxing income and aggregate accidental bequests
Beq in order to ﬁnance its expenditures on government consumption G, government trans-
fers Tr, and transfers to the one-year old households ˜ m:6
PG + Tr + ˜ m = ¿rrk + ¿wN + Beq: (14)
Furthermore, the government provides social security beneﬁts that are ﬁnanced by taxes.
3.5 Stationary equilibrium
The concept of equilibrium applied in this paper uses a recursive representation of the
consumer’s problem following Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989). Let Áj(k;m;d; ¯ e;z) and
Vj(k;m;d; ¯ e;z) denote the measure and the value of the objective function of the j-year
old agent with equity k, real money m, deposits d, average earnings ¯ e, and idiosyncratic
productivity level z, respectively. Vj(k;m;d; ¯ e;z) is deﬁned as the solution to the dynamic
program:
Vj(k;m;d; ¯ e;z) = max
k0;m0;d0;c






subject to (7). k0, m0, d0, ¯ e0, and z0 denote the next-period value of k, m, d, ¯ e, and z, re-
spectively. Optimal decision rules at age j are a function of k, m, d, ¯ e, and z, i.e. consump-
tion cj(k;m;d; ¯ e;z), deposits dj(k;m; ¯ e;z), next-period capital stock kj+1(k;m;d; ¯ e;z), and
next-period real money balances mj+1(k;m;d; ¯ e;z). In case II, the optimal share of cash
goods also depends on the individual state variables, ³j = ³j(k;m; ¯ e;z).
We will consider a stationary equilibrium where factor prices, aggregate capital, and labor
are constant and the distribution of wealth is stationary.
6We assume that the ﬁrst-period money balances are ﬁnanced by the government from, for example,
accidental bequests. Alternatively, we could have modelled an intergenerational structure as in Laitner
(1992,1993) and assume that the 50-year old agents (corresponding to j = 30) leave their 20-year old
children (corresponding to j = 1) real money balances ¯ mh
0. In this case, we would have also made the
assumption that agents do not die until age j = 30, which is in good accordance with empirical survival
probabilities. Our results, however, are not aﬀected by our modelling choice with regard to the ﬁnancing
of ˜ m.
114 Calibration
Periods correspond to years. We assume that agents are born at the real lifetime age 20
which corresponds to j = 1. Agents work T = 40 years corresponding to a real lifetime age
of 60. They live a maximum life of 60 years (T R = 20) so that agents do not become older
than the real lifetime age 79. The sequence of conditional survival probabilities fsjg59
j=1 is
set in accordance with the age-speciﬁc death rates in the US in the year 2000. The data is
taken from the United States Life Tables 2000 provided by the National Center of Health.7
The survival probabilities almost monotonously decrease with age. For the ﬁnal period of
our model, we set the survival probability s60 equal to zero.
The calibration of the production parameters ® and ± and the Markov process e(z;j) is
chosen in accordance with existing general equilibrium studies: Following Prescott (1986),
the capital income share ® is set equal to 0.36. The annual rate of depreciation is set
at ± = 0:08. Earnings are the product of real wage per eﬃciency unit times the labor
endowment e(z;j). The labor endowment process is given by e(z;j) = ezj+¯ yj, where ¯ yj
is the mean lognormal income of the j-year old. The mean eﬃciency index ¯ yj of the j-
year-old worker is taken from Hansen (1993) and interpolated to in-between years. As a
consequence, we are able to replicate the cross-section age distribution of earnings of the
US economy. We also normalize the average eﬃciency index to one. The age-productivity
proﬁle is hump-shaped and earnings peak at age 50. In our benchmark case, agents diﬀer
in log labor endowments at birth and there is no income mobility within an age cohort so
that zj = zj¡1 for all j > 1. In the appendix, we also study the case where the idiosyncratic
productivity shock zj follows a Markov process:
zj = ½zj¡1 + ²j; (16)
where ²j » N(0;¾²). Huggett (1996) uses ½ = 0:96 and ¾² = 0:045. Furthermore, we follow
Huggett and choose a lognormal distribution of earnings for the 20-year old with ¾y1 = 0:38
and mean y1. As the log endowment of the initial generation of agents is normally dis-
tributed, the log eﬃciency of subsequent agents will continue to be normally distributed.
This is a useful property of the earnings process, which has often been described as log-
normal in the literature. With our earnings speciﬁcation, we are also able to replicate the
7See Table 1 in Arias (2002).
12earnings heterogeneity that is observed in US data. Henle and Ryscavage (1980) compute
an earnings Gini coeﬃcient for men of 0.42 in the period 1958-77. In the model without
(with) earnings mobility, the Gini coeﬃcient also amounts to 0.424 (0.44).
The social security payment b(¯ e;j) is calibrated and parameterized in order to match the
US Social Security System and exactly follows Huggett and Ventura (2000).8 Average











=j for j · T
¯ ej¡1;t¡1 else.
(17)
Notice that in the US beneﬁts depend on mean earnings that are indexed so that later
contributions in life are not discounted. Furthermore, average earnings are only calculated
for up to some maximum earnings level emax which amounts to 2.47 times average earnings
¯ E.9 Following Huggett and Ventura, we set the lump-sum beneﬁt b0 equal to 12.42% of
GDP per capita in the model economy. Finally, beneﬁts are regressive and a concave
function of average earnings. Let ¯ eh and ¯ E denote the average earnings of individual h and
the average earnings of all workers, respectively. Depending on which earnings bracket the
retired agent’s average earnings ¯ eh were situated, he received 90% of the ﬁrst 20%¢ ¯ E, 32%
of the next 104% of ¯ E, and 15% of the remaining earnings (¯ eh¡1:24 ¯ E) in 1994. Therefore,
the marginal beneﬁt rate declines with average earnings. The social security contribution
rate µ is calibrated so that the budget of the social security balances. The remaining
parameters of the government policy that we need to calibrate are the two tax rates ¿r
and ¿w and government expenditures G. The two tax rates ¿r = 42:9% and ¿w = 24:8%
are computed as the average values of the eﬀective US tax rates over the time period
1965-88 that are reported by Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994). The share of government
consumption in GDP is G=Y = 19:5%, which is equal to the average ratio of G/Y in the
US during 1959-93 according to the Economic Report of the President (1994). The model
parameters are presented in table 2.
We choose the coeﬃcient of risk aversion ¾ = 2.10 The discount factor ¯ = 1:011 is set
equal to the estimate of Hurd (1989). In case 1, the remaining parameter ° from the utility
8For a more detailed description of this procedure please see Huggett and Ventura (2000).
9In the US Social Security System, only the 35 highest earnings payments are considered in the calcu-
lation of the average earnings. We simplify the analysis by using all 40 working years in our model.
10All our qualitative results also hold for the case ¾ 2 f1;4g.
13Table 2: Calibration of parameter values for the US economy
Description Function/Parameter Parameter Value
utility function U = (c°m1¡°)
1¡¾
1¡¾ ¾ = 2:0,
° = 0:9785 (case 1)
° = 1 (cases 2 and 3)
discount factor ¯ ¯ = 1:011
production function Y = K®N1¡® ® = 0:36







c(i) ·0 = 0:240, Â = 0:3232
·1 2 f0;0:5g
money growth rate ¹ ¹ = 0:0432
income tax rates ¿r;¿w ¿r = 42:9%, ¿w = 24:8%
government consumption G G=Y = 19:5%
social security beneﬁts
maximum earnings level emax emax = 2:47 ¯ E
lump-sum beneﬁt b0 b0 = 0:1241Y
b1(¯ ²) earnings bracket marginal beneﬁt rate
[0;0:2 ¯ E] 0.90
(0:2 ¯ E;1:24 ¯ E] 0.32
1:24 ¯ E < ¯ e · emax 0.15
14function is chosen to match the average velocity of money PY=M. During 1960-2001, the
average annual velocity of M1 amounted to 5.18, while the average inﬂation rate was equal
to 4.32%. We set ° = 0:9785 implying a velocity of money in our benchmark model
without productivity mobility equal to 5.18 (for ¼ = 4:32%). The initial endowment with
money ¯ Mh
0 is chosen to match the empirical distribution of money among the 20-year-old
generation. For this reason, we computed the cash holdings (relative to the average cash
holdings in the economy) of the income percentiles from the PSID 1994 data and wealth
ﬁles and choose ¯ Mh
0 =M in our model accordingly. In case 2, we follow Erosa and Ventura
(2002) and choose the parameters ·0 and Â so that i) 82% of all household transactions
are made with cash and ii) the semi-interest elasticity of money demand for inﬂation rates
between 0 and 10% amounts to 5.95.11 In our benchmark, ·1 = 0.
The computation of the model is brieﬂy described in the appendix.
5 Findings
5.1 Money-age proﬁle
5.1.1 Money in the utility
Figure 5 displays the age proﬁles of various variables for the money-in-the-utility model.
As typically found in life-cycle models, agents build up capital until retirement, T = 40,
and decumulate savings thereafter. Consumption is hump-shaped over the life-cycle (and
accords well with empirical observations) as the net interest rate exceeds the inverse of
the discount factor ¯ in young years. Since the survival probability declines in old age,
the discount factor increases and consumption declines again. Notice that our model is
able to replicate the hump-shaped money holdings that we observe in the data. Both
money holdings of each productivity class (upper right panel in ﬁgure 5) and average
money holdings of each generation (lower right panel in ﬁgure 5) are hump-shaped over
the life-cycle.
11In the preliminary version, we set Â = 0:3232 as in Erosa and Ventura (2002) and calibrate ·0 = 0:240
implying a cash share equal to 82%.
15Figure 5: Case 1: Money, capital and consumption over the life-cycle
Figure 6 displays the standard deviation and variational coeﬃcient of money holdings
within generations. While we are able to model the hump-shaped cash variance-age proﬁle,
the inequality of the cash distribution within generations increases with age in our model,
while it declines in the data. In addition, the variational coeﬃcient of the cash holdings
within generations in our model falls short of those values observed empirically and is
smaller by a factor 10. The Gini coeﬃcient of money is equal to 0.498 in our model.
Money is also much more positively correlated with income (0.775) than in the data (0.19).
5.1.2 Costly credit
While money holdings increases over age even after retirement in the money-in the utility
model, this observation does not hold in the economy with costly credit for the high-
productivity households. As presented in Figure 7, the more productive agents build
up high savings and increase the share of goods they buy with the help of credit. For
the agents with the highest productivity, money holdings decrease after model period 18
(corresponding to real life age 49). In their ﬁnal period of life, these agents ﬁnance less
than 10% with the help of cash (please see lower right picture in Figure 7).12
12In the ﬁnal version of the paper, we are planning to confront this fact with the data.
16Figure 6: Case 1: Dispersion and inequality of generational money holdings
Similarly, the standard deviation of cash holdings is more hump-shaped as older agents
ﬁnance a larger share of their consumption with the help of credit. The dispersion of
money of age is illustrated in Figure 8. Compared to the empirical age distribution in
Figure 2, the model with costly credit ﬁts the data more accurately than the money-
in-the-utility model. However, the inequality of generational money holdings, again, is
hump-shaped and does not decline prior to retirement age.
The correlation of money with income is a little lower than in the money-in-the-utility
model as richer agents ﬁnance a higher share of their consumption with costly credit.
However, it is still much larger than in the data (0.65 versus 0.19). In addition, we ﬁnd
a stronger correlation of money and wealth (0.50) than in the data (0.35). Therefore,
also the cash-credit economy does not proliferate a much more realistic description of the
empirical observed portfolio allocation on money and wealth among households than the
money-in-the-utility model.
5.1.3 Limited participation
In the limited participation model, consumption can be ﬁnanced by both cash and the wage
or wage replacement income (pensions). For this reason, cash holdings of the income-rich
17Figure 7: Case 2: Money, capital and consumption over the life-cycle
agents sharply increase at the age of retirement as pensions in period 41 are much lower
than wage income in period 40 (see Figure 9). Likewise, the cash share, deﬁned as the
ratio of cash holdings to consumption also increases in period 41 when the agents retire.
We do not observe this eﬀect for the low-income households as pensions are almost equal
to the wage income for these agents. Remember that, in the US, pensions also consist of a
large lump-sum component. Since the behavior of the cash share and its change is diﬀerent
between the income groups we also observe an increase of the dispersion and inequality
of cash holdings around retirement. The dispersion and the inequality of cash holdings
among the generations is illustrated in fFigure 10.
Because of the sharp increase of money holdings during retirement we also observe a low
correlation of money with income. In fact, the correlation of these two variables in the
model (0.02) is even lower than the one observed empirically (0.19). Therefore, we carefully
conclude that the introduction of a wage component in the cash-in-advance constraint
helps to reconcile the implications of the model for the cross-section distribution with the
empirical observations. Similarly, the correlation of money with wealth amounts to 0.27
(0.33 in the data), and the Gini coeﬃcient of money is equal to 0.53.
18Figure 8: Case 2: Dispersion and inequality of generational money holdings
5.2 Optimal monetary policy
The optimality of the Friedman rule has been demonstrated to hold in many inﬁnitely-lived
representative agent models. However, recent literature on OLG models has shown that
optimal inﬂation rates can also be positive. In the following, we will compute the actual
numbers for optimal inﬂation rates for our three speciﬁcations of money demand.
Table 3: Optimal steady-state monetary policy
optimal inﬂation Welfare gain
rate for ¼ = 0%




In our money-in-the-utility model the optimal inﬂation rate is equal to 4.6% (see table
3). Reducing the inﬂation rate from the average postwar US inﬂation rate of 4.32% to
0% entails steady-state welfare losses equivalent to 1.15% of total consumption. Welfare
19Figure 9: Case 3: Cash and cash share over the life-cycle
losses are even more signiﬁcant in the case of the cash-credit economy and the limited-
participation model. Clearly, the OLG model with income heterogeneity behaves diﬀerent
from the inﬁnitely-lived representative-agent model.
6 Conclusion
When we extend the familiar inﬁnitely-lived representative economy with either 1) money-
in-the-utility, 2) costly credit or 3) limited participation to the overlapping-generations
model with heterogeneous productivity types, we encounter many counterfactual implica-
tions for the money-age and cross-sectional money distribution. None of these economies
with either of the three money demand motives is able to reconcile its implications for the
20Figure 10: Case 3: Dispersion and inequality of generational money holdings
money distribution with the empirical facts with regard to the dispersion of money hold-
ings and the cross-section correlation of money with income and wealth. Furthermore, all
three speciﬁcations imply huge welfare losses from a reduction of the steady state inﬂation
rate from the US postwar average of 4.32% to 0% amounting to more than one percentage
point of consumption. We conclude that our knowledge of the cross-section distribution of
money is limited. Further research is needed in order to understand the dispersion of cash
holdings over the life-cycle.
21References
Arias, E., 2002, United States Life Tables 2000, National Vital Statistics, vol. 51, 1-38.
Bhattarcharya, J., J. Haslag, and S. Russelll, 2005, the role of moneyin two alterna-
tive models: When is the Friedman Rule optimal and why?, Journal of Monetary
Economics,
D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez, J., V. Quadrini, and J.V. R´ ıos-Rull, 1997, Dimensions of Inequality: Facts
on the U.S. Distributions of Earnings, Income, and Wealth, Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis Quarterly Review 21, 3-21.
Dotsey, M., and P. Ireland, 1996, The welfare cost of inﬂation in general equilibrium,
Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 37, 29-47.
Erosa, A., and G. Ventura, 2002, On inﬂation as a regressive consumption tax, Journal
of Monetary Economics, vol. 49, 761-95.
Freeman, S., 1987, Reserve requirements and optimal seigniorages, Journal of Monetary
Economics, vol. 19, 307-14.
Gillman, M., 1993, The welfare costs of inﬂation in cash-in-advance economies with costly
credit, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 31, 97-115.
Gomes, F., and A. Michaelides, 2005, Optimal Life Cycle Asset Allocation: Understanding
the Evidence, The Journal of Finance, forthcoming.
Hansen, G., 1993, The cyclical and secular behavior of the labor input: comparing eﬃ-
ciency units and hours worked, Journal of Applied Econometrics 8, 71-80.
Heer, B., and A. Maußner, 2005, Dynamic General Equilibrium Modelling: Computational
Methods and Applications, Springer: Berlin.
Heer, B., and B. S¨ ussmuth, 2006, Eﬀects of Inﬂation on Wealth Distribution: Do stock
market participation fees and capital income taxation matter?, Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, forthcoming.
Henle, P., and P. Ryscavage, 1980, The distribution of earned income among men and
women 1958-77, Monthly Labor Review, April, 3-10.
Huggett, M., 1996, Wealth distribution in Life-Cycle Economies, Journal of Monetary
Economics, vol. 17, 953-69.
Huggett, M., and G. Ventura, 2000, Understanding why income households save more
than low income households, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 45, 361-97.
Hurd, M., 1989, Mortality risk and bequests, Econometrica, vol. 57, 779-813.
22Mendoza, E.G., A. Razin, and L.L. Tesar, 1994, Eﬀective tax rates in macroeconomics:
Cross country stimates of tax rates on factor incomes and consumption, Journal of
Monetary Economics, vol. 34, 297-323.
Prescott, E., 1986, Theory Ahead of Business Cycle Measurement, Federal Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, vol. 10, 9-22.
Schreft, S., 1992, Transaction costs and the use of cash and credit, Economic Theory,
vol. 2, 283-94.
Stokey, N., J.R. Lucas, and E.C. Prescott, 1989, Recursive methods in economic dynamics,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Ma.
Tauchen, G., 1986, Finite State Markov-Chain Approximations To Univariate and Vector
Autoregressions, Economics Letters, vol. 20, 177-81.
237 Appendix
7.1 First-order conditions: cash-credit economy (not to be pub-
lished)
In steady state prices are constant, q = w, and the individual state only depends on age j
and productivity ².

































































Interior solution 0 < ³j < 1 if
[1 + (1 ¡ ¿r)r]k
²
j + (1 ¡ ¿w ¡ µ)we(z;j) + b(¯ ej) + tr + Seign < !t+1




j = ¸j + Ψj(1 ¡ ³j) (18)
¸jw·(³j) = Ψjcj (19)





mj = cj(1 ¡ ³) (22)








Fx(t;x) dt + F(b(x);x) b0(x) ¡ F(a(x);x) a0(x):
24)
w·(³j) = Rcj (23)
c
¡¾
j = ¸j (1 + (1 ¡ ³j)R) (24)
mj = (1 ¡ ³j)cj; (25)
where the nominal interest rate R is given by
R = [1 + (1 ¡ ¿r)r](1 + ¼) ¡ 1
In the case ³j = 0:
mj ¸ cj (26)
c
¡¾
j = ¸j (27)
cj = [1 + (1 ¡ ¿r)r]k
²
j + mj + (1 ¡ ¿w ¡ µ)we(z;j) + b(¯ ej) + tr + Seign ¡ !j+1 (28)
w·(0) > Rcj: (29)
257.2 First-order conditions: economy with limited participation
(not to be published)

























j + (1 ¡ ¿w ¡ µ)we(z;j) + b(¯ ej) + tr + ΩB + k
²


























First-order conditions (we drop the index ²):
c
¡¾
j = ¸j + ¹j
¸j(1 + ¼) = ¯sj+1 [¸j+1 + ¹j+1]
¸j(1 + ¼) = ¯sj+1 [(¸j+1 (1 + (R ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ¿r))]
¸j = ¯sj+1 [(¸j+1 (1 + (1 ¡ ¿r)r)]:
Furthermore, cash holdings are non-negative:
xj ¸ 0
If xj > 0, the cash-in-advance constraint is binding if R > 1 (which is always the case for
our calibration):
cj = (1 ¡ ¿w ¡ µ)we(z;j) + b(¯ ej) + x
²
j
The two ﬁrst-order conditions with regard to the two interest-yielding assets imply equal
returns:
(1 + (1 ¡ ¿r)r)(1 + ¼) = (1 + (R ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ¿r))
In equilibrium, the portfolio allocation of the household is indeterminate and we consider
the asset aj ´ k+dj. Only the aggregate variables d and k are ﬁxed by the equilibrium
26conditions for the two interest rates R and r in the credit market and the factor market
equilibrium for capital.
Of course, in the ﬁnal period of the life, the household dissaves completely, kT+TR+1 =
dT+TR+1 = 0. Also, the cash-in-advance constraint is binding. Consequently, after inserting
the CIA in the budget constraint, we ﬁnd:
(1 ¡ ¿r)rkT+TR + tr + ΩB + (1 + (R ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ¿r))dT+TR = 0
As ΩB > 0 and tr > 0 for our calibration, the household holds negative assets in the
last period. This clearly is an awkward implication of our extension from the inﬁnitely-
lived representative agent model to the model with ﬁnite lifetime as it is in contradiction
to empirical observations for the US economy. However, we can easily circumvent this
problem if we introduce either 1) uncertain lifetime or 2) a bequest motive.
7.3 Computation
7.3.1 Money-in-the-utility
We solve a system of non-linear equations that is composed of the equilibrium conditions
and the ﬁrst-order conditions of the households. In order to use a modiﬁed Newton algo-
rithm (that automatically scales down the step size if the array bounds are exceeded) we
have to provide a good initial value. Therefore, we ﬁrst solve the model without money that
can be computed recursively starting in the last generation (see Heer/Maussner, 2005). In
the model with money, we use the solution from the model without money and compute
the initial guess for money with the help of the corresponding Ramsey model.
The Gauss programs hs olg1a.g, hs olg1b.g, hs olg1c.g can be downloaded from the web.
7.3.2 Cash-credit economy
The computation is adapted from Erosa and Ventura (2002, Appendix A.1). Diﬀerent from
the authors, we compute an OLG model with earnings-dependent pensions.
We use value function iteration where the value function is a function of productivity,
accumulated earnings, and wealth ! ´ k + (1 + ¼)m. The problem is solved in two
stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the optimal portfolio allocation is computed given the optimal
next-period wealth !0 = !0(!; ¯ e;z). The optimal capital stock, k0 = k0(!0; ¯ e;z), and the
optimal money stock, m0 = m0(!0; ¯ e;z), are functions of next-period wealth !0, and present
productivity and accumulated pension beneﬁts. Therefore, we have to solve the system of
two equations, the budget constraint and the ﬁrst-order condition (23).
27In the second stage, the optimal intertemporal allcoation problem is solved. We use discrete
value function iteration and compute the optimal next-period wealth !0 = !0(!; ¯ e0; ¯ e;z;z0).
Since we have deterministic productivity and exogenous labor supply, next-period average
earnings and productivity are functions of this-period variables: z0 = z, ¯ e0 = ¯ e0(¯ e;z).
Therefore, we can simply compute !0 = !0(!; ¯ e0;z0) (in case of productivity mobility, this
is not possible).
The optimal policy functions are updated slowly so that we ﬁnd a solution to the non-linear
equation system.
The Fortran: cashcred.dsw can be downloaded from the web.
7.3.3 Limited participation
In the ﬁrst step, we try to ﬁnd an initial value for the capital stock and the cash holdings
of generations t = 2;:::;T + T R. For this reason, we use value function iteration. We
choose a coarse grid over fxt;ktg, t = 2;:::;T + T R. The Fortran program limpart.dsw
computes the solution.
In the second step, we solve the system of non-linear equations that consists of the ﬁrst-
order conditions of the household, the budget constraint and the cash-in-advance con-
straint, the equation for the government budget balance, and the equilibrium condition in
the credit market.
Given initial guess of fxt;ktg, t = 2;:::;T + T R, we can compute the consumption from
the budget constraint, c1
t, and maximum consumption subject to the cash-in-advance con-
straint, c0
t. Actual consumption is given by the minimum of the two, ct = min(c0
t;c1
t).
Given cT+TR, we can solve
c
¡¾
j = ¸j + ¹j
and
¸j + ¹j = (¸j (1 + (1 ¡ ¿r)r)
in j = T + T R for ¸T+TR. Solving
¸j(1 + ¼) = ¯sj+1 [¸j+1 + ¹j+1] = ¯sj+1u
0(cj+1)
for j = T + T R ¡ 1;:::;1, we get f¸jg
T+TR
j=1 .
Consequently, the ﬁrst T + T R ¡ 1 = 59 conditions for kj are given by the remaining
ﬁrst-order condition:
28¸j = ¯sj+1 [(¸j+1 (1 + (1 ¡ ¿r)r)]
The remaining 59 conditions for xj follow from the following conditions: 1. If the cash-in-








If the cash-in-advance constraint is not binding, c0
j > c1
j and ¹j = 0, there are two possibil-




Second, cash holdings are negative. In this case,
xj = 0:
Two aggregate equilibrium conditions are given by the credit market equilibrium and the
government budget. They determine the ratio of aggregate capital stock to savings and
the government transfers.
The Gauss program lp olg1c.g should solve this problem. However, it does not work yet.
7.4 Sensitivity Analysis
7.4.1 Fixed transaction costs ·1 > 0
7.4.2 Productivity mobility
8 Anmerkungen fr Alfred
Lieber Alfred,
in der jetzigen Version treten noch folgende Ungereimtheiten und Schw¨ achen auf:
291. Money-in-the-utility: In der K¨ urze der Zeit habe ich jetzt einfach meine alte Kalib-
rierung f¨ ur die Produktivit¨ aten aus unserem business-cycle paper mit money ¨ ubernommen,
die nicht in ¨ Ubereinstimmung mit den empirischen Zahlen ist.
2. Cash-Credit economy:
² In diesem Modell tritt noch Kurioses auf. Der ALgorithmus in cashcredit.dsw
konvergiert zwar ganz hervorragend, aber die Reaktion der VOolkswirtschaft auf
eine Absenkung der Inﬂationsrate ist kontraintuitiv: 1) der Kapitalstock sinkt,
2) die Wohlfahrt sinkt drastisch. Ich habe die Bef¨ urchtung, ich habe doch noch
irgendwo einen Programmierfehler gemacht. Ich kann daher die Ergebnisse auch
nicht richtig erkl¨ aren. Oder ist es wirklich so einfach: Die HH ﬁnanzieren bei
niedrigen Inﬂationsraten mehr und mehr Konsum mit Cash, halten deswegen
weniger Kapital und das f¨ uhrt zu niedrigerem aggregiertem Sozialprodukt und
Konsum?
Im Augenblick steht ¨ ubrigens noch viel redundanter Code in cashred.for, den
ich oft eingef¨ ugt habe, um Zwischenergebnisse zu ¨ uberpr¨ ufen.
² Limited Participation
Die value function iteration l¨ auft, ist aber extrem langsam und ungenau, da ich
ein weites grid benutzen musste.
Die L¨ osung mit der direkten Berechnung der nicht-linearen Gleichungen (ﬁrst-
order conditions, constraints, equilibrium conditions) im Gauss program (siehe
oben in section 7.3.3.) klappt noch nicht.
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